The Effects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations by Robert E. Lipsey
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Effects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations
Volume Author/Editor: Martin Feldstein, James R. Hines Jr., R. Glenn Hubbard
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-24095-9
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/feld95-2
Conference Date: January 13-15, 1994
Publication Date: January 1995
Chapter Title: Outward Direct Investment and the U.S. Economy
Chapter Author: Robert E. Lipsey
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7738
Chapter pages in book: (p. 7 - 42)1  Outward Direct Investment and 
the U.S. Economy 
Robert E. Lipsey 
Any judgment about the wisdom of tax changes that raise or lower the profit- 
ability of American firms’ foreign operations must involve some judgment as 
to the desirability of increasing or decreasing the extent of these operations. 
The purpose of  this paper is to review past research on the effects of  U.S. 
firms’ overseas activities on the U.S. economy and to report some further anal- 
ysis with more recent data. 
The first question to be answered is what we mean by  the U.S. economy. 
The ambiguity of  the term troubles appraisals of  many policies. One way  of 
looking at it is to ask whether the object is to maximize gross national product 
or gross domestic product. The former is an ownership-based concept that in- 
cludes the profits from overseas operations of  US. firms and other income 
earned overseas by  U.S.  residents, but excludes profits earned in the United 
States by  foreign residents. The latter is a geographically based concept that 
covers production that takes place in the United States, regardless of owner- 
ship. It thus excludes profits and other income earned overseas (from overseas 
production), but includes all income earned in the United States (from produc- 
tion in the United States) by both U.S. and foreign residents. One way in which 
the distinction surfaces in policy discussions is over whether various types of 
assistance or preferences are to be applied to U.S .-controlled firms, regardless 
of  where they  operate, or to firms producing in the United States, whether 
domestically or foreign owned. 
I will try to construe the issue broadly. That means I will consider effects of 
outward foreign direct investment on the labor employed in the United States 
by the investing companies and also those on the companies themselves, in- 
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cluding their stockholders, and more generally on the trade and other aspects 
of the U.S. economy. 
Various studies of the behavior of multinational firms, including some of my 
own, view the firms as facing fixed, or relatively fixed, worldwide markets for 
their products and making decisions mainly about how to supply that demand 
most profitably. The firm is pictured as choosing whether to supply the demand 
by exporting from the United States, by producing abroad, or by licensing tech- 
nology, patents, or other assets owned by  the firm to foreign licensees who 
would produce outside the United States. 
The assumption of a fixed market for a firm tends to bias conclusions toward 
finding that foreign production by U.S. firms substitutes for production in the 
United States. An alternative view is that production abroad is often mainly a 
way of enlarging a firm’s share of foreign markets, or of preventing or slowing 
a decline in that share. The inadequacy of the fixed-market assumption is obvi- 
ous in any attempt to examine the impact of direct investment in service indus- 
tries since the nature of most of these industries precludes substantial exporting 
from one country to another and market share is almost completely contingent 
on production at the site of consumption. While this is most obvious for service 
industries, it applies equally to the service component of manufacturing indus- 
tries, a major part of the final value of sales of manufactured products. 
1.1  The Growth of Internationalized Production 
The establishment of foreign operations by American firms-and  the estab- 
lishment by any country’s firms of production, including sales and service ac- 
tivities, outside the home country-is  often referred to as the internationaliza- 
tion of production. In order to understand the process, and the reasons behind 
it, it is useful to ask whether it is uniquely or mainly an American phenomenon 
or is, under some circumstances, common to foreign firms as well. 
The studies of  Cleona Lewis (1938) and Mira Wilkins (1989) on foreign 
investment in the United States make it clear that direct investment and interna- 
tionalized production were not an American invention. When the United States 
lagged technologically in many fields, foreign firms found it profitable to de- 
velop marketing and production facilities in the United States to exploit their 
superior sophistication. The industrial distributions of  these operations from 
different countries clearly reflected some specific technological advantages, 
such as those of Great Britain in various aspects of the textile industry and of 
Germany in chemicals. 
What has been unique about the United States is that direct investment has 
been the characteristic form of  U.S. foreign investment as far back as data 
exist, even when the United States was still, on balance, importing capital (Lip- 
sey 1988).  That fact, and the lists of early U.S. investors (Lewis 1938; Southard 
1931; Wilkins  1970) concentrated among the leading firms in  various U.S. 
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large aggregate supplies of financial or physical capital but with the possession 
of firm-specific assets, knowledge, and techniques, sometimes reflected in pa- 
tents or brand names, that are mobile within firms, even across national bor- 
ders, but not among firms. 
Not only was direct investment the dominant form of U.S. outward invest- 
ment, but the United States was the dominant source of the world’s direct in- 
vestment for a long period. The U.S. share of  the world’s  stock of  outward 
direct investment was  over half around 1970, with the United Kingdom, the 
next most important investor, far behind at about 15-17  percent and no other 
single country the source of more than 6 percent. The share of  the developed 
countries’ outward direct investment flows originating in the United States was 
well over half in the 1960s and still over 40 percent in the 1970s. In the late 
1980s, however, less than 20 percent of the world’s outward flows originated 
in the United States, and in a reversal of roles, the United States absorbed over 
40 percent of the flows from other countries (Lipsey 1993).  In the early 1990s, 
Japan’s role as a source of direct investment flows and the U.S. role as a recipi- 
ent both declined sharply. In  1992, the United States was  again the largest 
supplier, at about a quarter of the OECD total, and was not a significant net 
recipient, withdrawals and losses equaling or exceeding gross inflows (OECD 
1993, table I). 
The heyday of outward U.S. direct investment outflows, in the 1960s and at 
least part of  the  1970s, involved a considerable internationalization of  U.S. 
firms’ production, in the sense that higher and higher proportions of the pro- 
duction they controlled took place abroad, larger proportions of their employ- 
ees were outside the United States, and larger shares of their assets came to be 
located abroad. Since then, however, the degree of internationalization of U.S. 
companies has stabilized or declined, as if the firms had overshot some desir- 
able level and found it desirable to retreat somewhat. 
The peak in the extent of internationalization in this sense for the US.  econ- 
omy as a whole was reached some time in the late 1970s (we cannot date it 
more closely because comprehensive data exist only for occasional foreign 
investment census years). For example, employment in all overseas affiliates 
of U.S. firms was almost 11 percent of total U.S. nonagricultural employment 
in  1977, but only 7.5 percent in  1989. Plant and equipment expenditures by 
majority-owned foreign affiliates were over 15 percent of domestic U.S. plant 
and equipment expenditures in U.S. dollars in 1974-76  but fell below 10 per- 
cent from 1984 to 1988 and have not recovered their earlier levels. Since the 
exchange value of the U.S. dollar was low in the late 1980s, the decline in real 
terms was even larger. 
U.S. manufacturing firms have long been much more internationalized than 
firms in other industries, with their overseas employment reaching about a 
quarter of domestic manufacturing employment in 1977 (from only 10 percent 
in 1957) and then declining only slightly to about 22 percent in the late 1980s. 
Overseas plant and equipment expenditures in manufacturing reached over 20 10  Robert E. Lipsey 
percent of domestic expenditure in dollar terms for a few years in the 1970s. 
It fell almost to 10 percent when the exchange value of the dollar was near its 
peak, and then recovered, but so far not to earlier peak levels. 
Within those U.S. firms that are multinational, the changes have not been so 
sharp, partly because of the importance of manufacturing firms in the universe 
of multinationals. However, the time pattern has been similar since 1977 (there 
is little parent firm information available before that). 
Within  manufacturing  multinationals,  foreign  affiliate  net  sales,  a crude 
measure of production, were larger in the late 1980s relative to parent sales 
than in  1977, and affiliate employment was close to the earlier levels relative 
to parent  employment. Thus, this group of firms has not exhibited the shift 
away from internationalized production that has characterized U.S. multina- 
tionals in general or the U.S. manufacturing  sector as a whole. The affiliate 
share of production may even have increased (though it is too volatile to pro- 
vide a quick judgment that there is an upward trend), and the affiliate share of 
employment has not changed much since 1977. 
The strongest case for increased internationalization in U.S. manufacturing 
is in exports. Affiliates accounted for less than a third of U.S. multinationals’ 
worldwide exports in  1966, but for more than half in the second half of the 
1980s and the early  1990s. Their  importance relative  to total manufactured 
exports from the United States also more than doubled over this period. 
The contrast between the changes in internationalization within U.S. parents 
and those for the U.S. economy as a whole reflects the declining role of multi- 
national parents within the U.S. economy. Parent employment in the United 
States fell from 28 percent of U.S.  nonagricultural  employment in  1977 to 
barely over 20 percent in the late 1980s, not because employment was moved 
overseas,  where affiliate employment was also declining, but because  these 
multinationals were declining in importance as part of the U.S. economy. This 
decline was not simply a reflection of the decline of manufacturing’s share of 
U.S. employment, but took place within manufacturing as well, where manu- 
facturing parent firms’ share of total domestic manufacturing employment fell 
from over 60 percent in 1977 to a little over 50 percent in 1988-90.  Thus, the 
shrinking of many large, established U.S. manufacturing firms affected both 
their domestic and their foreign employment. The many anecdotes about the 
shifting of domestic employment abroad do not seem to add up to much in the 
aggregate, especially for the U.S. economy as a whole. 
There is one reason why it is as yet difficult to judge whether the apparent 
retreat of U.S. firms from foreign operations during the 1980s is a long-term 
trend. The enormous  shift in direct investment  toward the United States by 
foreign firms, to the point where the United States absorbed an unprecedented 
share of the rest of the world’s outflow of direct investment, suggests that the 
United States was an exceptionally attractive location for investment  during 
this period. If that was the case, it might have been particularly attractive, rela- 
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firms, and that attractiveness would show up as a retreat from internationaliza- 
tion for U.S.  firms while it tended to increase the degree of internationalization 
of foreign firms. 
One reason for this apparent retreat of American firms from overseas activity 
may have been the growth of efficient and aggressive foreign competitors. The 
levels of  internationalization of  the German and Japanese economies were 
much lower than that of the United States in the 1970s. Since then, the interna- 
tionalization pioneered on a large scale by American firms has been copied by 
European and Japanese firms, and now even by  firms from developing coun- 
tries. 
How widespread is internationalized production in the sense of firms pro- 
ducing outside their home countries? And is it expanding in the world economy 
as a whole? Two opposite influences are at work. Internationalization is most 
prevalent in manufacturing and least common in services. The rising powers 
in  manufacturing, such as Japan  and some of  the developing countries of 
Southeast Asia, are increasing the degree to which their companies carry out 
their manufacturing outside the home countries. At the same time, the share of 
manufacturing in most of the world’s economies is declining, and that of ser- 
vices is increasing. The net result of these two forces, and of the opposite direc- 
tions of changes in the United States and in other countries, is that the share of 
internationalized production in world output, after increasing greatly in the 20 
years after 1957, perhaps tripling, has grown little since then. The share of 
Japanese, German, and Swedish firms’ internationalized production has been 
rising, but that rise has been offset by  the fall in the much larger U.S. share. 
Internationalized production by firms from other countries has almost certainly 
been rising, but it is starting from too low a level to have much impact on the 
total. The share of  such production in worldwide GDP may have been in the 
range of  10-15  percent in  1990. The U.S. companies accounted for half or 
more of this total, and if the rise from the recent low point in 1988 continues, 
internationalized production will again be of growing importance. 
A less equivocal story can be told about the share of  production outside 
home countries in world trade in manufactured goods. That share is clearly 
over 10 percent and seems to have risen even since 1977, mainly because of 
the growth of Japanese affiliate exports, but also because U.S. affiliates have 
held on to or even increased their shares since 1977. Thus, world trade in man- 
ufactures, if not necessarily aggregate world production or employment, is in- 
creasingly made up of exports from internationalized production. 
What can we conclude from these trends in the extent of internationalized 
production? The practice of producing outside the home country is well en- 
trenched, especially in manufacturing, not only for US.-based companies but, 
increasingly, for firms based in other countries. It is increasingly common for 
firms in at least the more successful developing countries, such as Korea and 
Taiwan.  Presumably, it  is  an  avenue  for  increasing profitability, probably 
through increasing market shares that provide economies of scale in the exploi- 12  Robert E. Lipsey 
tation of the firm's assets, such as patents, other technological assets, reputa- 
tion, and more generally, skills in production and marketing. 
1.2  Overseas Production and Export Market Shares in Manufacturing 
The share of  the United States, as a country, in world export markets for 
manufactured goods has been declining over most of the last quarter century. 
In the early 1990s, after some recovery from the low point in 1987 that resulted 
partly from the earlier period of high exchange values for the dollar, the share 
was about 12 percent, 25-30  percent below the level in 1966 (table 1.1). U.S. 
multinational firms, exporting from the United States and from their over- 
seas production, held on much more successfully. By  1985, when the United 
States  had  already  lost  more  than  20  percent  of  its  share  of  20  years 
earlier, U.S. multinationals had increased their share of  world exports (table 
1.2). They then  lost some of  that  in the next two years, but  in  the early 
1990s retained a share a little above that of  1966. How was this relative sta- 
bility  achieved?  Performance  was  very  different  for  the  parent  firms, 
exporting from the United  States, and  the  affiliates, exporting from  other 
countries. 
Until at least 1985, the parent firms lost less of  their world export shares 
than did nonmultinational U.S. firms (table  1.3).  Then the parent share fell 
sharply, more rapidly than that of other U.S. firms. In the meantime, more and 
more of multinational exports were supplied by their overseas affiliates, more 
than half since 1986, and a record high proportion in 1990-92.  Thus, one way 
the U.S. multinationals kept their export markets, as the United States lost 
Table 1.1  U.S. Share of World" Exports of Manufacturedb  Exports (%) 
Year  Share 
1966  17.1 
1977  13.2 
1982  14.6 
1985  13.4 
1986  11.9 
1987  11.3 
1988  12.1 
1989  12.8 
1990  12.1 
1991  12.6 
1992  12.4 
Source: United Nations trade tapes, extended to 1991 and 1992 by estimates derived from data in 
United Nations (1993, 1994). 
"Market  economy. 
bAs defined in Bureau of  Economic Analysis (BEA) investment data, including  manufactured 
foods, but excluding petroleum and coal products. 13  Outward Direct Investment and the U.S. Economy 
Table 1.2  Exports by U.S. Manufacturing  Multinationals"  as a Share of World 
Manufactured Exports (%) 
Year  Share 
1966  15.8 
1977  15.5 
1982  17.4 
1985  18.1 
1986  16.6 
1987  15.6 
1988  16.1 
1989  16.4 
1990  16.1 
1991  16.4 
1992  16.0 
Source: United Nations trade tapes and Lipsey (1995). 
Nore: For other definitions, see table 1.1. 
OParents and majority-owned affiliates. 
Table 1.3  Parent and Affiliate Export Shares (%) 
Share of World 
Manufactured Exports 
Majority-Owned  Affiliate Share of 
Year  U.S. Parents  Affiliates  Multinational Exports 
1966  11.0  4.8  30.4 
1977  9.1  6.4  41.2 
1982  9.3  8.1  46.4 
1985  9.4  8.7  48.2 
1986  8.2  8.4  50.9 
1987  7.5  8.2  52.2 
1988  7.7  8.3  52.0 
1989  8.0  8.4  51.4 
1990  7.3  8.8  54.4 
1991  1.6  8.8  53.8 
1992  7.2  8.8  54.8 
Source: United Nations trade tapes and Lipsey (1995). 
Nore: For definitions, see tables 1.1 and 1.2. 
competitiveness in their industries, was by  supplying these markets increas- 
ingly from overseas operations, a strategy obviously not available to nonmulti- 
national U.S. firms. (The affiliate shares included in this calculation are only 
shares of export trade and exclude the much more important affiliate sales in 
their host-country markets.) 
This rise in  the importance of  exporting from foreign affiliates was  not 14  Robert E. Lipsey 
unique to the United States. Even in Japan, an extremely successful exporter 
from home-country production, exports by overseas affiliates rose from 8 per- 
cent of exports from Japan in 1974 to 14 percent or more in 1986-89.  Japan’s 
share of  world manufactured exports reached a peak in 1986, shortly after the 
high point in the exchange value of the dollar, and the declined from 1986 to 
1990 before recovering slightly (table 1.4). As the country’s export share de- 
clined, the share of overseas manufacturing affiliates in their firms’ total ex- 
ports grew from 1986 to 1989, and almost certainly after that as well. Thus, in 
Japan, as in the United States, foreign operations seemed to play a defensive 
role in retaining export markets for firms under adverse conditions for parent 
exporting (table 1  S). 
Sweden underwent large losses in trade shares similar to those of the United 
Table 1.4  Japanese Share of World Manufactured Exports (%) 
Year  Share 
~ 
1965  6.8 
1970  8.7 
1974  10.5 
1977  11.1 
1982  12.1 
1986  13.7 
1987  12.5 
1988  12.4 
1989  12.0 
1990  10.9 
1991  11.5 
1992  1 I .4 
Source: United Nations trade tapes. 
Note: For definitions, see tables 1.1 and 1.2. 
Table 1.5  Affiliate Share of Japanese Multinational Worldwide Exports (%) 
Year  Share 
1974  7.2 
1977  7.1 
1980  8.0 
1983  13.4 
1986  10.7 
1988  12.2 
1989  12.3 
Source: Lipsey (1995). 
Nore: For definitions, see tables 1.1 and 1.2. 15  Outward Direct Investment and the U.S. Economy 
States, although not quite as large. Swedish multinational firms, over the same 
period, retained or increased their shares, though the increase was concentrated 
in  1965-70  (table 1.6). This stability in the share of Swedish multinationals 
was accompanied by, or possibly accomplished by, a large shift in the sources 
of export production, with the portion of exports sold by foreign affiliates ris- 
ing from a tenth of total multinational exports in 1965 to over a third in 1990 
(table 1.7). 
These three countries are the only ones that collect fairly comprehensive 
information on the trade of their multinationals’ overseas affiliates. The data 
suggest that one major role for overseas production has been that of retaining 
market  shares when home-country economic conditions and  exchange rate 
changes made the home countries less suitable locations for export production. 
An  alternative interpretation of the data, discussed below, might be that it 
was the growth of affiliate production and exports that caused the reduction in 
home-country exports. However, home-country shares can be explained to a 
large extent by home-country price and exchange rate movements, not a likely 
path for influences stemming from decisions to produce abroad. 
Table 1.6  Swedish Share of World Manufactured Exports and Exports by 
Swedish Multinationals  as a Share of World Manufactured 
Exports (%) 
Swedish 
Year  Sweden  Multinationals 
1965  3.0  1.6 
1970  2.9  2.0 
1974  2.9  2.0 
1978  2.4  1.8 
1986  2.3  1.8 
1990  2.1  1.7 
Source: United Nations trade tapes; Swedenborg et al. (1988); data from the Industriens Utred- 
ningsinstitut of Stockholm. 
Table 1.7  Affiliate Share of Swedish Multinational Worldwide Exports (%) 
Year  Share 
1965  10.4 
1970  12.5 
1974  15.9 
1978  19.3 
1986  24.3 
1990  34.6 
Source: Swedenborg et al. (1988); data from the Industriens Utredningsinstitut of Stockholm. 16  Robert E. Lipsey 
1.3  Does Foreign Production Substitute for Home-Country Exports? 
Most antagonism against foreign direct investment has historically been to- 
ward inward investment, on the ground that it displaced home-country firms in 
home markets. However, there has also been opposition to outward investment, 
often led by labor organizations, on the ground that outward investment “ex- 
ports jobs,” partly by  producing products to be imported to the home-country 
market but mostly by replacing home-country exports by overseas production. 
In the United States, the campaign against outward direct investment reached 
a peak with the effort to pass the Burke-Hartke bill in the 1960s, the Voluntary 
Program of Capital Restraints from 1965 through 1967, and then with the com- 
pulsory Office of Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) regulations. These came 
into effect in  1968 as an  effort to “improve” the U.S. balance of  payments 
and were specifically directed against the outflow of capital for foreign direct 
investment. The government restrictions were ceilings on the export of funds 
for foreign direct investment, particularly to Western Europe, but were not 
aimed at the expansion of U.S. firms’ foreign operations if the expansion was 
financed from foreign sources (Fiero 1969). With the defeat of Burke-Hartke 
and the demise of  the OFDI in 1974, the campaign has faded, although the 
AFL-CIO continues to take a dim view of  outward investment in its annual 
statements on economic policy. 
Attempts to measure the effects of  overseas production on home-country 
exports face the problem of defining substitution and of defining a believable 
counterfactual case, Exports from Japan’s recently established or recently en- 
larged operations in Southeast Asia may “replace” exports that formerly came 
from Japan, but few would claim, after the rise in the exchange value of  the 
yen, that they are replacing exports that could now  be made from Japan. A 
cross-sectional analysis does not necessarily escape the problem; it may  be 
precisely those more labor-intensive industries that can no longer export from 
the home country that establish production abroad. 
A long line of  studies has attempted to find evidence of a relationship be- 
tween overseas production and home-country exports. One of the earliest U.S. 
studies, by Gary Hufbauer and F. M. Adler (1968), identified the crucial impor- 
tance of the assumptions used to the interpretation of any relationships found, 
and a similar wide range of possible effects was reported in a major U.S. Tariff 
Commission (1973) study a few  years later. The Reddaway reports (1967, 
1968) explicitly assumed that in the absence of  British foreign affiliates, their 
markets would have been supplied not by British exports but by local or other 
foreign suppliers. 
The preponderance of evidence from empirical studies points to either no 
effect or a positive effect of overseas production in a host-country market on 
home-country exports to that market. Lipsey and Weiss (1981), in  a cross- 
sectional analysis examining exports in  14 manufacturing industries by  the 
United States and by  13 other developed countries, to many destinations, found 17  Outward Direct Investment and the U.S. Economy 
that the level of production by US.-owned affiliates in a country was positively 
related to U.S. exports in that industry to that country and, in some markets, 
negatively related to exports by other developed countries. On the other hand, 
the presence of affiliates from countries other than the United States was posi- 
tively related to those countries’ exports to that host country and, where there 
was any significant relationship, negatively related to U.S. exports to the coun- 
try. In other words, the presence of, and production by, a home country’s affili- 
ates in a host country tended to attract exports from that home country and to 
discourage exports to that host country from other countries. Thus, the main 
substitution that seemed to take place was of country A’s  host-country produc- 
tion in country C for country B’s exports to country C, and of country B’s host- 
country production in country C for country A’s  exports to country C. In these 
calculations, the variables for US-owned and foreign-owned affiliate activity 
were superimposed on a  set of  standard gravity equations including host- 
country income or aggregate imports, distance from home to host country, and 
trade bloc membership. The estimated trade position in the absence of direct 
investment is represented by the value of exports when the home-country affil- 
iate activity variable is set at zero while the other variables, including foreign 
country affiliate variables, are at their actual levels. Since the dependent vari- 
ables in these equations are total U.S. and other country exports, rather than 
the exports by parents, they take account of  any displacements of one firm’s 
exports to a country by the production in that country by  affiliates of another 
firm from the same home country. 
Each dollar of overseas production by U.S. affiliates in these cross-sectional 
equations added, on average across the statistically significant coefficients, 
about $0.16 to U.S.  exports. Most of the coefficients were below $0.20. The 
coefficients for displacements of other countries’ exports were not so consis- 
tently significant and varied widely, but whenever coefficients for both U.S. 
and other countries’ exports were significant, the displacement of other coun- 
tries’ exports was larger than the addition to U.S.  exports. That is a reasonable 
result since the addition to US. exports to a host country is the net balance of 
positive and negative effects of U.S.-owned production there, while the effect 
on other countries’ exports to that host country are generally only negative, 
with no offsetting gains. One exception to this negative relation to foreign 
countries’ exports would be the case in which the U.S. parent has affiliates in 
the other countries that are potential suppliers to the host country. Thus a US.- 
owned auto assembly plant in, say, the Netherlands might give rise to exports 
of auto components from the same company’s German affiliate rather than, or 
in addition to, exports from the parent in the United States. 
If a US.-owned affiliate in one country exported to other countries, it could 
displace U.S.  exports to those countries without the offsetting effect of exports 
of components and other inputs to the manufacturing process. That displace- 
ment would be missed in the equations just described, and Lipsey and Weiss 
(1  984) therefore examined the effects of aggregate affiliate production abroad 18  Robert E. Lipsey 
on the total exports to all destinations of the cross section of parent firms. The 
results were that the displacement of U.S. exports to third countries, if it ex- 
isted, was not large enough to offset the positive effects on parent exports to 
host countries; that is, in each industry, firms that produced more abroad also 
exported more in the aggregate. 
It is natural to think that exports by affiliates to third countries would neces- 
sarily displace  parent  exports to them, but that  is not necessarily  the  case. 
A plane, truck, or car assembled or even produced completely by a U.S. affil- 
iate in country A and exported to country B could later give rise to the ex- 
port  of  parts,  accessories,  and  related  products  from the  United  States  to 
country B. 
An examination of the same question for a later period (Blomstrom, Lipsey, 
and Kulchycky 1988), using the direct investment census for 1982 (U.S. De- 
partment  of  Commerce 1985),  produced  more ambiguous results. The later 
study lacked the information on affiliates of non-U.S. firms that had been part 
of the earlier study, but did distinguish between affiliate production for export 
and affiliate production for local sale in the host country, and also included 
some equations for production  by  minority-owned  U.S. affiliates  not avail- 
able earlier. 
When there was any statistically significant relation  at all (a minority  of 
industries), affiliate export sales, or production for export from the affiliate’s 
host country, were consistently associated with higher U.S. exports to that host 
country. That is to be expected,  since substitution of affiliate production for 
U.S. exports, if there was any, would take place outside the host country, in the 
third country, and would be unobserved. For sales within the host country, most 
coefficients were positive, but there were more negative (5  out of 30 industries) 
than positive coefficients among those that were statistically significant at the 
5 percent level. 
When data for minority-owned  affiliates  in the host  countries,  including 
those 50 percent owned, were added to the U.S. export equations, these affili- 
ate operations were found to be associated with higher levels of U.S. exports 
to the host countries. In addition, the inclusion of these affiliate operations had 
a strong effect on the coefficients for production by majority-owned affiliates, 
moving many from showing negative effects on U.S. exports to positive  ef- 
fects. 
The role of minority-owned affiliates is puzzling, and we can only speculate 
on the explanation. One factor is their very uneven distribution across coun- 
tries. They are, for example, almost the only form of direct investment in Japan 
and quite important there. We have speculated that minority ownership has this 
strong positive relationship to US. exports because it may be a last resort in 
countries or industries where the U.S. parent would otherwise be barred from 
a market. These may be markets with more stringent barriers to imports, or 
where barriers to imports are associated with bamers to majority ownership of 
affiliates. Minority-owned affiliates may, in such cases, be a price for market 
entry more often than in the case of majority ownership. 19  Outward Direct Investment and the US.  Economy 
Sweden is the only country outside the United States for which individual 
firm data are available that permit an analysis similar to those carried out for 
the United States. A series of  Swedish outward direct investment surveys was 
carried out by the Industriens Utredningsinstitut (IUI), of Stockholm, and ana- 
lyzed in Swedenborg (1973, 1979, 1982, 1985) and, for the 1986 survey, in 
Swedenborg, Johansson-Grahn, and Kinnwall (1 988). They examined the ef- 
fects of overseas production by Swedish firms on Swedish parent exports. Be- 
cause of the small number of Swedish parent firms, it was not possible to run 
separate equations for individual industries, particularly industries as narrowly 
defined as in the U.S. studies. However, the Swedish calculations included 
many firm characteristics that, in effect, incorporated industry characteristics, 
and also separated companies based on Swedish resource industries. 
The Swedish studies included an effort to solve the problem of the possible 
simultaneity of direct investment production decisions and home-country ex- 
port decisions by a 2SLS approach in which the first stage estimated the level 
of  production by  Swedish affiliates in each host country. The second-stage 
equation used the estimated production levels from the first stage, among other 
variables, in the explanation of parent exports to each host country. These equa- 
tions were applied to each of  the survey years and in a pooled time-series- 
cross-sectional analysis. Swedenborg concluded (1985, 235) that OLS estima- 
tions, such as those reported above for the United States, overstated the positive 
effects of  affiliate production on parent exports. Her own estimate, from the 
2SLS  equations, was that each dollar of  Swedish affiliate production added 
about $0.10 to Swedish parent exports, not very far from the U.S. results men- 
tioned above. From a breakdown of parent exports by type she concluded that 
only 2 percent of the sales provided by foreign production would be replaced 
by parent exports if foreign production were abandoned. 
A somewhat different analysis was performed by Blomstrom et al. (1988) 
for 1978, using the same data source as for Swedenborg’s studies but in more 
aggregated form and with each industry’s total manufactured exports from 
Sweden, rather than only parent exports, as the dependent variable. All the 
coefficients on affiliate sales were positive and, in fact, larger in a 2SLS analy- 
sis than in the OLS equations. There was no evidence in the comparison with 
Swedenborg’s estimates for parent exports that the positive effect on Swedish 
parent exports came at the expense of exports by other Swedish firms. It seems 
more likely, although the equations are too different from Swedenborg’s to 
produce a definitive conclusion, that affiliate production encouraged not only 
parent exports to the affiliates’ host countries, but also exports to the same 
countries by  other Swedish firms. 
An  examination of  changes over  1970-78, from the same source of  data, 
showed similar results: the greater the increase in Swedish affiliate production 
in a country, the greater the growth of exports of manufactures from Sweden 
to that host country. A single exception was metal manufacturing, where both 
a high 1970 level of  Swedish-controlled production and high growth in that 
production in 1970-78  were associated with reductions in Swedish exports. 20  Robert E. Lipsey 
A recent IUI report (Svensson 1993) challenges the earlier findings for Swe- 
den using some of the same data along with the latest, still unpublished, survey 
for 1990. The report concludes that an increase of $1 in affiliate production 
for local host-country  sale reduces parent exports by $0.14 and that affiliate 
production for export to third countries reduces parent exports by over $0.40 
for each dollar of such affiliate production. 
The apparent contradiction of earlier results is attributed by the author to his 
accounting for the effect of affiliate production for export on parent sales to 
third countries. However, such effects were included in the analysis of  total 
parent exports by U.S.  firms in Lipsey and Weiss (1984) without producing 
any similar negative effects. The major source of  the difference from earlier 
results seems to be the formulation of the equations, which normalizes across 
firms by the total worldwide sales of the multinational firm rather than by par- 
ent sales, as in Swedenborg’s earlier studies. The difference is never pointed 
out and this normalization is described as a way of eliminating heteroskedastic- 
ity. In fact, the result is that what is being tested is the relationship between the 
share of worldwide sales provided by production camed out in a host country 
and the share of home-country  (parent) exports to that country in the firm’s 
worldwide  sales. It is  virtually  a certainty  that  these  coefficients  for host- 
country production shares will be negative, but those negative coefficients can 
be interpreted as a negative influence on the absolute value of home-country 
exports only under an odd implied assumption that is never discussed. The 
assumption is that in the absence of foreign production the total size of  the 
multinational firm’s worldwide sales or production would be the same as with 
foreign production-if  Electrolux did not produce in many countries, it would 
have the same worldwide sales as it has with foreign production. That assump- 
tion would seem to guarantee a negative coefficient for foreign production on 
home-country  exports, but it is not a plausible assumption on which to rest 
a study. 
On the whole, then, it would seem reasonable to conclude that production 
outside the United States by U.S.-based  firms has little effect on exports from 
the United States by parent firms or by U.S. firms as a whole, and that to the 
extent there is an effect, it is more likely to be positive than  negative. This 
relationship is probably a characteristic of other countries’ multinationals as 
well. One reason this is true is that foreign production is undertaken to expand 
or retain a parent firm’s foreign markets and parent exports are incidental to 
these decisions. As foreign affiliates mature, their imports from their parents 
become  marginal  to  their  total  activity  and  fluctuate  with  exchange  rate 
changes and other developments, but there is no indication that the absolute 
level of imports from the home country declines over long periods. 
1.4  Foreign Production and Home-Country Labor 
Aside from the relation of overseas production to exports from the United 
States, such production could affect the overall demand for labor within the 21  Outward Direct Investment and the U.S. Economy 
United States by parent firms, and the demand for labor of different types, even 
if  total production in the United States were not affected. For example, the 
demand for labor by  parent firms might be reduced if  more labor-intensive 
products were  allocated to  multinationals’ foreign operations, while more 
capital-intensive operations were allocated to U.S. operations. Similarly, the 
demand for unskilled labor by parents might decline if parts of the production 
process or products requiring highly skilled labor were allocated to the United 
States, while processes or products requiring relatively low skills were allo- 
cated to overseas affiliates. 
The opportunity for multinational firms to engage in such geographical allo- 
cation of their production presumably requires that the product be tradable. If 
a firm’s output must be consumed where it is produced, as in many  service 
industries, production will take place where the goods and services are sold 
and  will  respond to host-country demand and to host-country  costs. There 
could still be differences among production locations in capital intensity and 
skill intensity. These might reflect the elasticity of substitution between capital 
and labor or between labor of different skills if there are significant differences 
in factor prices, but these should affect the affiliate operations rather than those 
of the parents. More important, there could still be effects of affiliate opera- 
tions on parent capital or skill intensity if the needs for certain typically central 
functions, such as coordination, management, and research and development, 
were affected by affiliate operations. 
In this analysis, the level of  home-country (parent) production is taken as 
given, and the question is whether, within this fixed level of  home-country 
production, the composition of  parent production is affected by  the parent 
firm’s foreign production activity in such a way  as to alter the parent firm’s 
demand for labor and for more-skilled, as compared with less-skilled, labor. 
One sign that more labor-intensive activities were being allocated to foreign 
affiliates or that production methods were being changed in response to differ- 
ences in factor prices would be a lower capital intensity in affiliate production 
than in parent production and a lower capital intensity in low-income countries 
than in high-income countries. The data on net property, plant, and equipment 
per worker from the latest US.  outward investment census indicate that in 
manufacturing as a whole, the physical capital intensity of production in devel- 
oped countries by all affiliates of manufacturing parents was about 80 percent 
of that of parents in the United States. The capital intensity of manufacturing 
affiliates in developing countries was only 42  percent of  that in developed 
countries. In contrast, in a broadly defined services group-including  all in- 
dustries except manufacturing, petroleum, agriculture, mining, and transporta- 
tion, communication, and public utilities-the  physical capital intensity of af- 
filiates was higher than that  of  their parents in the United States. And  for 
affiliates in developing countries outside of those in manufacturing and petro- 
leum, physical capital intensity was higher than for affiliates in the developed 
countries (US.  Department of Commerce 1993, tables II.B8, II.Bl3, II.G4, 
II.Gl1, II.Ll, and 1I.Pl). Of course, some of the difference in these aggregate 22  Robert E. Lipsey 
comparisons  may  rest on differences in industry composition not related to 
responses to factor price differences  at all. However, it is hard to avoid the 
impression that manufacturing firms adapt affiliate production to differences 
in factor prices to a much larger extent than service industry firms do. 
A much more thorough investigation of whether multinational firms adapted 
their factor proportions to relative factor prices  (Lipsey, Kravis, and Roldan 
1982) concluded that these firms did use more labor-intensive methods of pro- 
duction, as measured by  property, plant, and equipment per worker, in  low- 
wage countries. The form that the adaptation took could have been selecting 
labor-intensive subindustries for production in low-wage countries, selecting 
labor-intensive production processes for such production, selecting small-scale 
operations for which only labor-intensive methods of production were avail- 
able, or operating in a labor-intensive way,  whatever technologies  were se- 
lected. These relationships  were visible not only within  industries but  also 
within individual firms, and for Swedish as well as American multinationals. 
Judging from these aggregate data, manufacturing firms were more respon- 
sive to factor price differences in allocating their direct investment activity than 
were service industry firms. The reason could be simply a higher elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labor in manufacturing than in services, or it 
could be that the tradability of manufactured products makes them more suit- 
able for the  allocation  of,  for example, labor-intensive  activities  to  labor- 
abundant,  cheap-labor countries. In the former case, of  higher  elasticity  of 
substitution in manufacturing, there should not be any effect of overseas pro- 
duction on parent labor intensity. In the latter case, of allocation of activities 
in response  to factor prices,  larger overseas operations should produce less 
employment in the United States relative to sales (lower labor intensity of pro- 
duction). 
The predominance of evidence for individual manufacturing firms and their 
affiliates in six industry groups in the 1982 investment census was that higher 
overseas production was associated with lower employment at home, given the 
level of parent production (Kravis and Lipsey 1988). That was the case for all 
manufacturing firms as a group and within most of  the six major industry 
groups. The only exceptions were that sales by  majority-owned  affiliates in 
electrical machinery and by minority-owned affiliates in nonelectrical machin- 
ery were positively related to parent employment, for any level of parent pro- 
duction. 
Some calculations from the latest outward investment census, for 1989, sug- 
gest a similar relationship, as in equation (1): 
(1)  PEMP = 1,234  + 6.14 PNS -  .77 ANS,  R’  = .867, 
(5.0) (58.1)  (5.9) 
where 23  Outward Direct Investment and the U.S.  Economy 
PEMP =  parent employment; 
PNS = 
ANS = 
parent net sales (sales less imports from affiliates), in million 
affiliate net sales (sales less imports from the United States), in 
Each million dollars of  affiliate production (as proxied by  affiliate net sales) 
gave rise to a loss of  almost one parent employee, given the level of  parent 
firm production. 
If we separate net sales of affiliates into those of manufacturing and of non- 
manufacturing affiliates, we find that the negative relationship comes from the 
manufacturing production; each million dollars of manufacturing affiliate pro- 
duction subtracts about 1.4 workers from parent employment, while each mil- 
lion  dollars of  nonmanufacturing affiliate production adds  1.2 parent em- 
ployees: 
(2)  PEMP = 1,160  + 6.16 PNS -  1.38 MANS 
dollars; and 
million dollars. 
(4.7)  (58.7)  (7.6) 





These equations assume that the impact on parent employment is related to 
the absolute value of  affiliate production: an addition of  a million dollars of 
affiliate production has the same impact on parent employment whether the 
affiliates are one-tenth the parent’s size, in the aggregate, or twice the parent’s 
size. 
The same calculations can be performed within the major manufacturing 
industry groups, reducing the influence of interindustry differences. Across in- 
dustries, any relation between parent labor intensity and foreign operations is 
more likely to represent an effect of labor intensity on the tendency to produce 
abroad than of foreign production on domestic labor intensity. 
The parent employment level equations for major industry groups are sum- 
marized in table 1.8. Within the major industry groups, the relationships are 
mixed. In transportation equipment, the group with the largest affiliate sales, 
the relation is negative; each million dollars of affiliate net sales is associated 
with parent firms’ having five fewer employees.’ In the next largest industry in 
manufacturing affiliate net sales; and 
nonmanufacturing affiliate net sales. 
1. There may be an interindustry effect here; the group includes two very different industries, 
motor vehicles and  equipment and other transportation equipment, mainly aircraft. The motor 
vehicle industry accounts for almost all the foreign affiliate sales, while the other transportation 
equipment industry accounts for more than half the parent employment. 24  Robert E. Lipsey 
Table 1.8  Equations for Parent Employment as a Function of Parent and 
Foreign Affiliate Production, 1989 (six major industry groups) 
Coefficients for 
Affiliate Net Sales 
Constant  Parent  Non- 
Industry  Term  Net Sales  Total  Manufacturing  manufacturing  RZ 










4,125  4.87 
(5.7) 
4,125  4.86 
(5.7) 
840  4.93 
(18.0) 
1,033  4.82 
(2.5)  (17.5) 
611  6.04 
(2.5)  (26.8) 
629  5.98 
(2.6)  (26.1) 
480  6.47 
(2.4)  (28.2) 
475  6.54 
(2.4)  (26.9) 
1,642  4.87 
(5.1)  (30.6) 
1,618 
(5.4) 
-257  9.10 
(.3)  (47.2) 
-250  9.18 
(.4)  (77.5) 
-.58 
(.4) 










-  .40  -  1.82 
(.7)  (2.1) 
-7.53  7.89 













Notes: Parent employment in number of employees. Parent and affiliate sales in million dollars. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
terms of affiliate  sales, machinery,  except electrical, each million  dollars of 
affiliate sales adds one employee to the parent rolls (the story is similar in the 
other, much  smaller, electrical and electronic machinery  group). And  in the 
other major investing industry group, chemicals, there is no relation to parent 
employment. 
If we separate the affiliates into manufacturing and sales, we see that the 
total affiliate sales coefficients are dominated by those for manufacturing affil- 
iates, again positive in the two machinery groups and negative in transporta- 
tion equipment. 
On the whole, these equations for absolute levels of parent employment are 
inconclusive, with a mixture of positive and negative relations. We would not 
conclude from these results that there is any clear effect of affiliate production 
on aggregate parent employment, given the level of parent production. 25  Outward Direct Investment and the U.S.  Economy 
A different view of the effect of overseas production on parent labor inten- 
sity is provided by relating employment per dollar of net parent sales-a  mea- 
sure of labor intensity-to  the ratio of overseas (affiliate) to domestic (parent) 
production, as in equation (3).  Virtually none of the variation in parent employ- 
ment per dollar of output is explained by the following: 
(3)  ANS  R2  = .ooo.  ___ -  9.45 + 1.53  ~ 
PEMP 
PNS ’  pNs  (6.3)  (1.1) 
The statistically insignificant coefficient suggests a positive relationship, with 
a 1 percentage point increase in the ratio of overseas production to home pro- 
duction associated with a 1.5 percentage point increase in the ratio of parent 
employment to sales. Such a positive relation might occur if affiliate produc- 
tion gave rise to needs for supervisory, research, or other types of  auxiliary 
employment in headquarters operations. The addition of parent net sales as a 
variable, on the theory that larger parent firms might be either more efficient 
or more bureaucratic than smaller ones, did not reveal any effect of parent size. 
A  distinction  between  manufacturing  and  nonmanufacturing  affiliates 
pointed to the former as having no impact on  parent labor intensity and the 
latter as being close to statistical significance at the 5 percent level but still a 
negligible degree of explanation of the variance in parent employment per dol- 
lar of production: 
(4)  ~-  ’EM’  - 9.53 - 
PNS  (8.1)  (1.0)  (.4) 
.0003 PNS +  .66 MANS 
+  6.48 NMANS,  8’ = .001. 
(1.8) 
Within the six major industry groups, the evidence points to a positive im- 
pact of foreign affiliate production, and particularly foreign manufacturing af- 
filiate production, on parent employment per dollar of production (table 1.9). 
The only statistically significant coefficients are in the two machinery groups, 
and also for manufacturing production in the food industry. Thus, from these 
calculations, we see no evidence of more capital-intensive activities at home 
from an allocation of labor-intensive activities to affiliates. More foreign affil- 
iate production, particularly more manufacturing production, seems to lead to 
more parent employment in the United States relative to U.S.  production. Most 
likely this is supervisory or other headquarters employment, but we have no 
evidence for this conjecture. 
The corresponding equation for parent employment in all service industries 
combined, from the 1982 data, showed much larger coefficients than for manu- 
facturing, negative for majority-owned affiliate sales and positive for minority- 
owned affiliate sales. However, the equations for individual service industries 26  Robert E. Lipsey 
Table 1.9  Equations for Parent Employment per Dollar of Production as a Function of 
Parent Size and Ratio of Foreign Affiliate to Parent Production, 1989 (six 
major industry groups) 
Coefficients for 
Ratio between Parent Net Sales 
and Net Sales of 
Constant  All  Manufacturing  Nonmanufacturing  Parent 
Industry  Term  Affiliates  Affiliates  Affiliates  Net Sales  R’ 
Metals 
Food and kindred  6.50 
products  (5.6) 
7.01 
7.29 












Machinery, except  8.22 





Electrical and  9.11 






Transportation  9.74 







-  ,046  -  .63 
(.4) 
2.46  -  .09 
(6.3)  (.I) 
8.06  -9.02 









-  ,745 
(3.2) 
-  ,739 
(3.2) 




-  .206 
(1.4) 
-  .207 
(1.5) 







-  ,002 
,006 
.ooo 












Notes:  Parent employment in number of employees. Parent sales in billion dollars. Affiliate sales in mil- 
lion dollars. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 27  Outward Direct Investment and the U.S. Economy 
produced mixed results: half the significant coefficients for majority-owned 
affiliate sales were positive and half negative. For most industries, no effect 
was visible, and only one coefficient for minority-owned affiliates was statisti- 
cally significant. Durable goods wholesale trade and insurance were the two 
service industries in which foreign affiliate sales were positively related to par- 
ent employment per dollar of parent sales, and nondurable goods wholesaling 
and engineering were the two with negative relationships (Kravis and Lipsey 
1988). 
One problem with interpreting the data for some service industries, particu- 
larly those in finance, is that the location of production is hard to define. Part 
of the sales attributed to a foreign affiliate on the books of the company for tax 
or related reasons may involve activity actually carried out in the United States. 
However, banking and insurance activities for host-country customers, in con- 
trast to those for international customers such as U.S. multinationals, are likely 
to require both host-country employment, without any substitution for domes- 
tic US.  employment, and also some supervisory or service employment in the 
U.S. parent firm. It is this likely effect, and the impact on multinational firm 
profits, that is the motivation behind the insistence of the United States on 
including service industry entry rules in the Uruguay round of GATT negotia- 
tions. 
A rough estimate can be made of the effect of changes in rules for entry into 
the insurance industry in various countries. Cross-country regressions of U.S. 
insurance affiliate sales (premium values) in various countries against income 
and various country characteristics, including the severity of  restrictions on 
entry by  foreign firms, suggested that a shift by all host countries to the most 
liberal regulation regimes would double the sales (premium values) of life in- 
surance by U.S.-owned affiliates and increase the sales of  nonlife insurance 
by  as much as a third. From the equation for the relation of  insurance parent 
employment to affiliate sales in Kravis and Lipsey (1988), it can then be esti- 
mated that parent employment in the United States would increase by  some- 
thing in the neighborhood of 10 percent. 
Aside from effects on the parent firms’ level of employment, the extent of 
foreign operations might also affect the composition of parent employment in 
the United States and the demand and wages for different skills. To the extent 
that parent firms in manufacturing can allocate activities at different skill levels 
to different locations to serve worldwide markets, we might expect that opera- 
tions intensive in low-skilled labor would be allocated to foreign affiliates, 
especially those in countries where low-skilled labor is cheap, and that high- 
skill functions would tend to be concentrated in the United States or, possibly, 
in other highly developed countries. 
Two types of evidence might shed light on this possibility. One is simply the 
allocation of  activities within U.S. multinationals. Another is the degree to 
which a larger share of  production carried out abroad is associated with  a 
higher level of skill in a firm’s U.S. labor force. 28  Robert E. Lipsey 
The data collected on employment include very little on the characteristics 
of the parent or affiliate labor forces. One of the few bits of information is the 
proportion of employees engaged in R&D activities, and another is the average 
compensation of employees, as a rough indicator of skill levels. 
The data on R&D employment emphasize the concentration of R&D activ- 
ity in parent companies (table 1.10). 
The share of parent employment in R&D is more than twice that in affiliates 
in almost every major industry group. It would be more appropriate to compare 
parents with their own affiliates, but those data are not published. Thus, many 
of  the affiliates in wholesale trade are subsidiaries of manufacturing parents, 
and including them in the manufacturing sector would heighten the contrast 
between parents and  affiliates in  both  manufacturing and  wholesale trade. 
Judging by the data on R&D expenditures, there is a further allocation of R&D 
activities between affiliates in developed and developing countries, with much 
higher R&D intensity in the former group (Lipsey, Blomstrom, and Kravis 
1990). 
An indication of responses to the price of skilled relative to unskilled labor 
was provided by  data for a cross section of Swedish firms and their affiliates. 
Although the definition of skilled and unskilled labor was a crude one (salaried 
vs. wage workers) and only a small portion of the variation in skill composition 
was explained, there did seem to be a consistent relationship in which more 
skill-intensive activities were allocated to countries where the price of skilled 
labor was lower relative to that of unskilled labor. 
Within U.S. multinational firms, the average level of  compensation per 
worker, as a crude indicator of average skill levels, can be related to the extent 
of production in majority-owned affiliates (Kravis and Lipsey 1988). In manu- 
facturing, the association is weak. The R2s are low and are significant at the 5 
percent level only for total manufacturing and for the food industry. In both 
cases, the share of assets overseas explained more of parent compensation lev- 
els than the share of production. The only coefficients that are statistically sig- 
nificant at the 5 percent level are positive ones for affiliate production shares 
in the same industries (Kravis and Lipsey 1988, appendix table 5). If  parent 
Table 1.10  Employment in R&D as a Share of Total Employment, 1989 (%) 
Industry  Parentsa  Affiliatest 
Manufacturing  5.46  2.42 
Petroleum and coal products  3.14  .66 
Wholesale trade  1.82  1.15 
Computer and data processing services  8.94  1.05 
Communication and public utilities  2.52  1.01 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1993, tables II.PI and III.G2). 
&All  nonbank parents of nonbank affiliates. 
bMajority-owned affiliates, by industry of affiliate. 29  Outward Direct Investment and the US.  Economy 
output and sales by minority-owned and majority-owned affiliates in absolute 
terms are used to explain parent compensation, a little better explanation is 
reached, but only parent output and minority affiliate output are ever statisti- 
cally significant, and the coefficients are always positive (Kravis and Lipsey 
1988, table 1). Thus the general impression is that if there is any influence of 
foreign operations it is a tendency toward high skill levels at home. 
Among service industries, the share of majority-owned affiliates in produc- 
tion produced significant R2s only for wholesale trade in nondurable goods, 
for all services, and for business services (Kravis and Lipsey 1988, appendix 
table 5). Adding the other variables produced little improvement in the degree 
of  explanation, but  the few  significant coefficients for  affiliate production 
were positive. 
On the whole, we can say that in both manufacturing and service industries 
the effect of foreign operations on the average skill levels in parent companies, 
if  any,  was to raise them, but  the  effect was  not  strong and  not universal 
across industries. 
1.5  Foreign and Domestic Investment as Competitors for Funds 
One channel by  which a decision by  a firm to invest in foreign production 
could affect investment in domestic production is the financial one. The mech- 
anism that would explain such an interdependence or interaction would pre- 
sumably imply an upward-sloping supply function for the firm’s external fi- 
nance, so that investments in different locations compete for investment funds. 
It is a channel that would escape the notice of most analyses that take the level 
of production in each location as given, or as determined only by demand and 
costs of production in each location. 
Studies of this question by Herring and Willett (1973)-and,  to some extent, 
by  Severn (1972) and Noorzoy (1980)-found  mostly positive relationships 
over time between domestic and foreign investment. Such relationships, de- 
rived mainly from aggregate data, could reflect common fluctuations or trends 
in demand rather than any interdependence. 
A study by  Stevens and Lipsey (1992), based on individual firm plant and 
equipment expenditure data running for 15-20-year periods between the 1950s 
and the  1970s, attempted to disentangle these effects. Although only seven 
firms had data complete enough to be analyzed, the results were fairly consis- 
tent in suggesting that there was such interdependence. A 1 percent exogenous 
rise in foreign demand or in a firm’s overseas output was estimated to reduce 
the parent firm’s U.S. fixed investment by  amounts ranging from 0.3 to 0.8 
percent in most of the firms. 
This is a tentative finding based on a small number of firms in a period of 
expanding foreign production by U.S. firms. It would be interesting to test the 
same model over the period of contracting or stagnant overseas production by 
U.S. firms and also on larger numbers of firms or on industry aggregates. 30  Robert E. Lipsey 
In any case, the possibility of this type of competition between foreign and 
domestic fixed investment is worth further investigation. 
1.6  Conclusions 
Many of the analyses of the effects of outward direct investment reviewed 
here implicitly assume that differences among firms and industries in various 
characteristics can be at least partly explained by differences in the degree to 
which they operate abroad. These same characteristics are also used to explain 
the propensity of  firms and industries to operate abroad. The explanation of 
the existence of direct investment and foreign production is centered on the 
idea that firms possess individual firm-specific assets, such as technologies, or 
patents, or skills in advertising or marketing, that can be exploited most profit- 
ably by  producing in many markets. These assets are mobile across interna- 
tional borders but not among firms, and firms cannot realize their value by 
selling them to other firms or by licensing them to other firms. 
The opportunity to exploit these firm-specific assets via direct investment 
adds to the incentive to acquire them. If  R&D intensity and human capital 
intensity are the strongest explanations of the worldwide trade shares of U.S. 
multinationals (Kravis and Lipsey 1992), and possibly of their shares in world 
production as well, a restriction on direct investment would reduce the value 
of investment in such assets and therefore reduce firms’ investment in them. If 
much of  foreign direct investment is defensive, as suggested earlier, it may 
make investment in firm-specific assets more profitable by extending the length 
of time over which they can be exploited, a suggestion made many years ago 
by Vernon (1  966). 
While firms from different countries tend to possess different comparative 
advantages, the leading firms in each country tend to internationalize their pro- 
duction. With the long-term decline in costs of international travel and commu- 
nication, the costs of controlling widespread production must be declining, and 
firms from most of the countries in the world are increasing the extent to which 
they produce outside their home countries. With that fact as background, it 
seems unlikely that the decline in internationalization of American firms’ pro- 
duction will go much further and seems more likely that it will be reversed. 
The availability of foreign production locations appears to have contributed 
a great deal to the ability of American multinational firms to retain their market 
shares in the face of declines in the market share of  the United States as a 
country. The same seems to be true for the trade shares of  firms from other 
countries, and this flexibility applies to softening not only the effects of long- 
term national declines in export shares and in comparative advantage in indi- 
vidual industries, but also those of short-term events such as large changes in 
exchange rates. 
The frequently expressed fear that American multinationals have been, in 
some sense, “exporting jobs” by substituting foreign production for American 31  Outward Direct Investment and the U.S. Economy 
production has very little empirical support. For one thing, overseas employ- 
ment and fixed investment have been, for the most part, declining relative to 
domestic employment and fixed investment for 10 or 15 years. And U.S.  firms 
that produce more abroad than others tend also to export more in general and 
to the countries where the foreign production takes place. The same relation- 
ship is evident for firms based in Sweden, the only other country collecting 
similar data on multinational parents and affiliates. Overseas production has 
much more to do with contesting market  shares than with finding low-cost 
production locations, although the latter is also a motivation. 
Within multinational firms, the higher the share of  overseas operations in 
the total production of the multinational, the higher the ratio of home employ- 
ment to home production, more often than not. A possible explanation is that 
a larger share of foreign production requires a larger number of headquarters 
employees, such as R&D staff and supervisory personnel, whose contribution 
to output is not confined to the firm’s domestic production. The relationship is 
not  unambiguous,  since  higher  absolute  (rather  than  relative)  production 
abroad is more often associated with lower home employment, given the level 
of home production, a finding we at one time interpreted as implying an alloca- 
tion of  more capital-intensive parts of  total production to the United States 
and of more labor-intensive parts to affiliates, especially those in developing 
countries. The interpretation that it is technical activities and management that 
are allocated to home operations is reinforced by the fact that higher propor- 
tions of  foreign activity are associated with higher average compensation at 
home. 
On the whole, the evidence suggests that the effect of  overseas production 
on the home-country labor market involves the composition of a firm’s home 
employment rather  than  the  total  amount. That  change  in  composition is 
mainly a shift toward more managerial and technical employment, much like 
the effects of increasing trade and other aspects of the evolution of the Ameri- 
can economy. 
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Comment  S. Lael Brainard 
Introduction 
Bob Lipsey is certainly the person best qualified to synthesize what we know 
about the relationship between  overseas affiliate activity and U.S. domestic 
activity, since most of what we know comes from his careful analyses of BEA 
data over the years. In this paper he draws on findings from a multitude of his 
own papers along with work by a variety of other authors and data from the 
most recent Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Benchmark Survey of U.S. 
Direct Investment Abroad to characterize this relationship along a variety of 
dimensions. His careful perusal leads him to draw several conclusions: 
1. The internationalization  of production  by  U.S. firms on aggregate has 
declined relative to its peak in the 1970s, but this is less true for the manufac- 
turing sector, and untrue for U.S.  multinationals. At the same time, the interna- 
tionalization of production by foreign firms has increased substantially. 
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2. Overseas affiliate sales do not appear to substitute for U.S. exports. In- 
deed, the two are positively correlated in aggregate. On the other hand, they 
do compete with exports from other countries. 
3. Domestic employment by U.S.  parents is negatively correlated with sales 
by overseas manufacturing affiliates and positively with sales by overseas sales 
affiliates. Further, the R&D intensity of parent employment is positively corre- 
lated with overseas affiliate sales. In addition, labodcapital ratios in overseas 
affiliate production  are negatively correlated with  wages in the destination 
market, and are on average higher than that of U.S.  parents. 
4. There is some evidence of  a negative relationship between increases in 
foreign affiliate sales and fixed investment by the parent at home. I will not say 
much about this since it will be addressed further in Martin Feldstein’s paper 
(chap. 2 in this volume). 
These conclusions come from a careful reading of the data and empirical re- 
search over the past 10 years and are carefully and conservatively stated. 
Lipsey’s research has touched on most of  the interesting issues involving 
outward direct investment and its effect at home. Luckily for researchers such 
as myself, there is enough ambiguity in some of the results to leave scope for 
alternative ways of addressing these questions, so we are not compelled simply 
to wait for additional years of survey data. I will go into greater depth in some 
of  the areas to amplify certain findings and highlight ambiguities, and then 
suggest areas that warrant additional research. 
Exports and Affiliate Sales 
The relationship between exports and affiliate sales is interesting and im- 
portant because it goes to the heart of the question whether increased overseas 
activity by U.S.  firms stimulates or substitutes for activity in the United States. 
Most of  the research in this area has focused on interesting questions but 
has estimated them in equations that are tenuously related to economic theory. 
For instance, many of  the regressions use exports as the dependent variable 
and  include  affiliate  sales as  an  independent variable (Swedenborg  1979; 
Blomstrom, Lipsey, & Kulchycky  1988; Lipsey and Weiss 1981). Yet  I have 
not seen any models which generate this type of reduced-form equation. For 
instance, neither of  the two broad frameworks that have been developed in 
recent years by  trade theorists to analyze multinationals’ location decisions 
would be consistent with such a specification. 
Factor proportions models of vertical expansion across borders-the  domi- 
nant view of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in trade theory-make  a com- 
plicated set of predictions regarding the relationship between exports and af- 
filiate sales (Helpman 1984; Markusen 1984; Ethier and Horn  1990). When 
cross-border investment is motivated solely by factor price differentials, multi- 
national activities arise only in a single direction within an industry between 
economies with strong factor proportions differences. The creation of multina- 
tionals may give rise to increased exports of intermediates in the same direction 35  Outward Direct Investment and the U.S.  Economy 
and of final goods in the reverse direction, in both cases diminishing the share 
of intraindustry trade. However, the model’s implications for the effect of mul- 
tinational activity on the total volume of trade are ambiguous. 
Proximity-concentration models explain horizontal expansion across bor- 
ders motivated by  advantages of proximity to consumers or specialized suppli- 
ers at the expense of concentration advantages such as scale economies (Krug- 
man  1983; Horstmann and Markusen  1992; Brainard 1992). These models 
predict that multinationals arise in industries characterized by high transport 
costs and trade barriers and low investment barriers and plant scale economies, 
even between countries with similar factor proportions. Such circumstances 
give rise to two-way penetration by multinationals. These models predict that 
affiliate sales substitute for exports of final goods but may generate intraindus- 
try exports of intermediate goods, so again the predictions for the total volume 
of trade are ambiguous. 
Indeed, I know of only one model that posits a causal linkage between affil- 
iate sales and exports, as is implied by the specification. In markets where the 
local presence of  U.S.  multinationals enhances the quality reputation of  all 
U.S. firms due to reputational spillovers, increased multinational activity ex- 
pands demand for both locally produced and imported varieties of U.S. prod- 
ucts (Raff 1992). 
Of  course, it is also possible that both the exports of  U.S. parents to their 
affiliates and the affiliates’ sales are counted in the same industry category due 
to the high level of industry aggregation at which BEA data are available (be- 
tween 2- and 3-digit SIC) or to the misclassification of manufacturing affiliates 
as sales affiliates. Some evidence for this is suggested simply by  netting out 
exports to affiliates, which significantly reduces the positive correlation, as 
shown in table lC.l. 
In any case, both the factor proportions and proximity-concentration models 
suggest that the positive correlation between affiliate sales and exports is likely 
to be attributable to determinants that affect both similarly rather than to a 
causal relationship. And indeed, there is evidence to support this. Grubert and 
Mutti (1991) find that an instrumental variables approach to estimating exports 
Table lC.l  Correlations 
Trade  Affiliate Sales  Net Affiliate Sales 
Inward 
Imports  .20 
Exports  .64 
Net imports  - 
Outward 





Source:  Estimates  from  Brainard  (1993b)  using  data from  U.S. Department  of  Commerce 
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yields negative insignificant coefficients on affiliate sales, controlling for pol- 
icy variables and income. Unfortunately, however, there are very few if  any 
instruments that are truly independent. 
Alternatively, instead of using either affiliate sales or exports as an indepen- 
dent  variable  and  the  other  as  a  dependent  variable,  the  proximity- 
concentration model suggests estimating the extent to which exogenous vari- 
ables such as trade and investment policies and transport cost differences affect 
the share of total sales accounted for by  affiliate sales as opposed to exports. 
In research along these lines, I find quite different results, which are shown in 
table 1C.2 and summarized below (Brainard 1993b): 
Factors that raise both exports and affiliate sales: 
Destination market income 
Home market income 
Transport costs 
Trade barriers and nontariff barriers 
Per capita income similarities 
Sustained depreciation of destination market currency 
Plant scale economies 
FDI  barriers 
Average corporate tax rate 
Factors that raise affiliate sales relative to exports: 
Factors that reduce affiliate sales relative to exports: 
Ambiguous factors: 
An alternative approach is to estimate the levels of affiliate sales and exports 
netting out exports mediated by affiliates; as is shown in table 1C.2, this yields 
surprisingly similar results with the exception of transport costs. 
Despite disagreement about the specification, this evidence has in common 
with the papers cited by  Lipsey that it provides little support for the factor 
proportions hypothesis. Indeed, related work (Brainard 1993a) suggests that 
the same empirical relationships that cast doubt on the importance of  factor 
proportions differences for explaining trade flows hold equally strongly for 
affiliate sales. The evidence shows that intraindustry affiliate sales (the share 
of  two-way flows within an industry relative to total flows) are increasing in 
factor proportion similarities, and the total volume of affiliate sales is increas- 
ing in relative income similarities. Of course, in some industries and in some 
countries, factor substitution seems to be the key driver. This is particularly 
evident in markets where foreign affiliates export a large share of production 
back to the United States (e.g., the share exceeds 30 percent for Singapore, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Canada). However, on aggregate it is only 13 percent. 
Foreign Affiliate Employment and Domestic Employment 
The obvious implication of casting doubt on the factor proportions hypothe- 
sis is to cast doubt on the degree to which multinationals substitute between 37  Outward Direct Investment and  the U.S. Economy 
Table 1C.2  Determinants of Affiliate Sales 
Outward Affiliate Sales  Inward Affiliate Sales 
SUR:  OLS:  SUR:  OLS: 
Share  Net Level  Share  Net Level 
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Source: Estimates from Brainard (1993b) using data from the 1989 Bureau of Economic Analy- 
sis survey. 
Nore: Col. (1) reports estimates (using seemingly unrelated regression [SUR]) of the log of the 
share of sales by  US. affiliates overseas in total U.S. sales to foreign markets (outward affiliate 
sales plus exports) and col. (2) reports estimates (using OLS) of the log of the level of U.S. affiliate 
sales in foreign markets net of U.S. exports to the affiliates, where the independent variables are 
in logs. Similarly, col. (3) reports estimates of the log of the share of sales by  foreign affiliates in 
the U.S. over total foreign sales in the U.S.  market, and col. (4) reports estimates of the log of the 
level of  foreign  affiliate sales into  the US.  market  net of  U.S.  imports by  foreign  affiliates. 
T-statistics are in parentheses. 
**1 percent significance level. 
*5 percent significance level. 
tl0  percent significance level. 
foreign and domestic factors of  production. I think the question of  how em- 
ployment overseas affects parent employment at home is a very interesting one. 
In Lipsey, Kravis, and Roldan (1982) using data from 1966 and 1970, Lipsey 
et al. show that the labor intensity of affiliate production exceeds that of parent 
production and is greatest for affiliates in developing countries. They also show 
that the labor intensity of production is negatively correlated with the destina- 38  Robert E. Lipsey 
tion market wage. In both cases, they provide evidence that these factor inten- 
sity differentials are attributable to within-industry and possibly within-firm 
differences rather than to industry selection, suggesting that firms vary their 
choice of production techniques to exploit factor price differences, or that dif- 
ferent activities are undertaken in different locations. This would be consistent 
with a factor proportions account. 
In the current paper, Lipsey examines regressions of parent employment on 
parent sales and sales by overseas affiliates, using 1989 data. He finds that the 
relationship between parent employment and affiliate employment is generally 
negative, and more so for manufacturing affiliates. Here again, however, the 
regression is a bit problematic since there is likely to be  correlation of  the 
errors associated with parent employment and parent sales. Indeed, in similar 
equations normalizing by the level of parent sales, Lipsey finds that a greater 
ratio of parent employees to sales is associated with increases in affiliate sales 
of both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing affiliates, which is inconsistent 
with a factor proportions account. 
There is also substantial interest in determining whether increases in over- 
seas affiliate employment abroad affects industry employment or wages in the 
United States. Obviously, this is only an interesting issue if there are rigidities 
in interindustry labor adjustment or industry wage premia apart from compen- 
sating differentials. Substantial empirical evidence suggests there are.' 
In recent research, Slaughter (1993) provides some evidence that suggests 
that domestic employment and foreign affiliate employment are weakly com- 
plementary at a highly aggregated level. Table 1C.3 shows that total U.S. man- 
ufacturing employment shrank 10 percent between  1979 and  1989, and that 
total overseas affiliate employment shrank 14 percent between 1977 and 1989. 
Southeast Asia is the only region to have experienced substantial growth. 
Lipsey 's  paper also distinguishes the employment effect for R&D employ- 
ees, and I agree that the heart of the matter may lie in shifts between different 
types of labor. Unfortunately, the BEA distinguishes production from nonpro- 
duction employees only in the benchmark surveys for the affiliates and does 
not distinguish at all in the parent data. Even so, it is interesting to note that 
foreign affiliates expanded their nonproduction labor abroad relative to their 
production labor between 1977 and 1989, a period in which demand for pro- 
duction labor in the manufacturing sector in the United States was stagnant 
and the relative demand for nonproduction labor grew. Table 1C.3 shows that 
while employment of production workers shrank 15 percent between 1979 and 
1989 in the United States, overseas affiliate production employment shrank 21 
percent between 1977 and 1989; it even contracted in Southeast Asia. During 
the same periods, employment of nonproduction workers grew by 5 percent in 
the United States while falling slightly overseas overall; in Southeast Asia it 
grew by 50 percent. These numbers yield little to no support to the claim that 
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Table 1C.3  Manufacturing Employment in U.S. and Overseas Affiliates, 1977-89 
(thousands) 
Non-  Nonproductionl 
Non-  Production  production  Total  Production 
Production  production  Total  Change  Change  Change  Ratio 
Region  1989  1989  1989  1977-89  1977-89  1977-89  1989 
World  1,875  1,369  3,244  -0.21  -0.02  -0.14  0.73 
Europe  83 1  673  1,504  -0.31  -0.10  -0.23  0.81 
Canada  27 1  179  450  -0.24  -0.12  -0.20  0.66 
Latin America  453  289  742  0.01  0.09  0.04  0.64 
Southeast 
Asia  197  106  303  -0.03  0.54  0.11  0.54 
United States”  12,356  5,437  17,793  -0.15  0.04  -0.10  0.44 
Wor1dAJ.S.  0.15  0.25  0.18  0.23  -0.14  0.27  1.66 
Sources: 1977 and 1987 BEA benchmark surveys; US.  Bureau of the Census (1979, 1989). 
”U.S. data is from 1979 rather than 1977. 
expansion by U.S. multinationals overseas was an important cause of reduced 
demand for production workers at home over the 1980s. Obviously, these num- 
bers are only rough indicators, and more systematic analysis is called for. 
Tax 
Lipsey’s paper focuses on the real effects of  overseas production. Most of 
the other papers in this volume focus on taxation. There is an interesting set of 
issues at the intersection of the two that are not generally addressed because 
of the separation between research in international trade theory and public fi- 
nance: namely, how do tax factors distort the location of real economic activ- 
ity? Of  course, there has been a fair amount of research investigating the ef- 
fects of taxes on FDI using both state and international data; here I am referring 
to overseas production rather than investment. 
The results in Grubert and Mutti (1991) suggest that U.S. exports and over- 
seas affiliate sales are both decreasing in destination market tax rates. The anal- 
ysis in Brainard (1993b) of the factors influencing location decisions also in- 
cluded a tax variable, with puzzling results. The ratio of foreign affiliate sales 
in the United States to imports is increasing in the source market tax rate, as 
expected. However, it appears that the ratio of U.S. affiliate sales to exports is 
also increasing in the tax rate in the destination market. This may be due to 
correlation with other macro-variables, or perhaps to the use of the wrong tax 
rate. In any case, it warrants further investigation. 
Conclusion 
The issues that Lipsey raises are important because of  the central role of 
multinationals in cross-border competition. Overseas affiliate sales by  U.S. 40  Robert E. Lipsey 
multinationals are more than double the level of U.S. exports in manufactures, 
and the ratio exceeds one on the inward  side. Moreover,  multinationals  are 
major conduits for international trade, mediating as much as half of  U.S. manu- 
facturing trade. 
These issues are also important because multinationals are a lightning rod 
for domestic politics.  Organized labor has long resisted outward FDI on the 
grounds that it reduces demand for labor at home. On the inward side, some 
critics are equally vehement in resisting control of U.S. assets by foreigners. 
For both  of these reasons, it is important that we develop a better under- 
standing of the actual effects on the U.S. economy of overseas production by 
U.S. multinationals as well as inward penetration  by foreign multinationals. 
Lipsey’s synthesis of the existing empirical literature addresses important ques- 
tions and interprets the findings in an appropriately cautious and relevant way. 
The additional findings I have cited above are consistent with his in sug- 
gesting that the majority of overseas activity is not motivated primarily by ac- 
cess to lower factor costs, but rather by market access considerations. This in 
turn suggests that labor employed by U.S. firms abroad may not substitute for 
domestic employment in the same industry. 
There are many areas with potential for future research. Given the nature of 
this audience, I will emphasize  one. I would  encourage more integration of 
public finance models with trade and investment models so that real and finan- 
cial factors can be considered  simultaneously.  Such integration has occurred 
in the investigation of FDI, but not of overseas production and sales. 
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